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The
RICIS
Concept
The University of Houston-Clear Lake established the Research Institute for
Computing and Information systems in 1986 to encourage NASA Johnson Space
Center and local industry to actively support research in the computing and
information sciences. As part of this endeavor, UH-Clear Lake proposed a
partnership with JSC to jointly define and manage an integrated program of research
in advanced data processing technology needed for JSC's main missions, including
administrative, engineering and science responsibilities. JSC agreed and entered into
a three-year cooperative agreement with UH-Clear Lake beginning in May, 1986, to
jointly plan and execute such research through RICIS. Additionally, under
Cooperative Agreement NCC 9-16, computing and educational facilities are shared
by the two institutions to conduct the research.
The mission of RICIS is to conduct, coordinate and disseminate research on
computing and information systems among researchers, sponsors and users from
UH-Clear Lake, NASA/JSC, and other research organizations. Within UH-Clear
Lake, the mission is being implemented through interdisciplinary involvement of
faculty and students from each of the four schools: Business, Education, Human
Sciences and Humanities, and Natural and Applied Sciences.
Other research organizations are involved via the "gateway" concept. UH-Clear
Lake establishes relationships with other universities and research organizations,
having common research interests, to provide additional sources of expertise to
conduct needed research.
A major role of RICIS is to find the best match of sponsors, researchers and
research objectives to advance knowledge in the computing and information
sciences. Working jointly with NASA/JSC, RICIS advises on research needs,
recommends principals for conducting the research, provides technical and
administrative support to coordinate the research, and integrates technical results
into the cooperative goals of UH-Clear Lake and NASA/JSC.
I
I
I An Overview of SAFENET and its
I Implications for Aerospace Applications
I
I
I George C. Collins
I Rodney L. Bown
University of Houston-Clear Lake
I February, 1991
I
I Cooperative Agreement NCC 9-16
Research Activity No. SE.26
I NASA Johnson Space CenterEngineering Directorate
Right Data Systems Division
I
I
I
I
Research Institute for Computing and Information Systems
University of Houston - Clear Lake
T'E.C.H.N.I.C.A.L R.E.P.O.R.T

Preface
II
This research was conducted under auspices of the Research Institute for
Computing and Information Systems by Dr. George C. Collins and Dr. Rodney L.
Bown, Associate Professors of Computer Systems Design at the University of
Houston-Clear Lake. Dr. Bown also served as RICIS research coordinator.
Funding has been provided by Engineering Directorate, NASA/JSC through
Cooperative Agreement NCC 9-16 between NASA Johnson Space Center and the
University of Houston-Clear Lake. The NASA technical monitor for this activity was
William C. Young, of the Project Integration Office, Flight Data Systems Division,
Engineering Directorate, NASA/JSC.
The views and conclusions contained in this report are those of the authors and
should not be interpreted as representative of the official policies, either express or
implied, of NASA or the United States Government.
11
|
II

An Overview of SAFENET and its Implications
for Aerospace Applications
by G. Collins and R. Bown
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently the Navy has developed a draft version of a standard for
local area networking that when adopted will become a military
standard. This standard is being developed for procurement
specifications of computer resources to be used on ships and
aircraft and has some of the same real-time concerns that network
standards for space vehicles have. This draft standard is Draft
SAFENET I Military Standard (MCCR-0032-DRAFT) and is to be used
with Draft SAFENET I Military Handbook (MCCR- 0034) copies of
which are attached to this report. An executive summary is also
attached, which gives an easy to read overview. This report will
introduce the basic concepts of Safenet and compare it to other
standards. A review of security issues in the SAFENET Handbook
and a discussion of recent LAN security developments will also be
included.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF COMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS
A. ISO Communication Standards
As the computer industry evolved, many techniques for data
communications and networking were developed by the various
vendors of computer equipment, both in the US and overseas. In
1977 the International Standards Organization (ISO) started a
project to define a standard architecture for computer
communications. Their work was submitted in 1979 and is known as
the OSI Reference Model, or the ISO Model of Architecture for
Open Systems Interconnection (ZIMM80). This standard has been
adopted and is found as ISO 7498 (see Table I.)
The basic model has 7 layers of communication services in which
communication protocols were to reside. The lowest layer (the
Physical Layer) produced the raw data stream that was to
propagate along the communications media. The second layer (Data
Link Layer) provides services that allow the link to be a
reliable communication channel; these services include error
detection and correction. Layer three is the Network Layer that
has protocols related to routing packets through a network, and
its interface was conceptually related to the interface into
public data networks. Hence layers 1-3 were originally conceived
as "network protocols" while the layers above were often termed
"host protocols". An example of this separation is the CCITT
standard known as X.25 (see Table I).
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The fourth layer (Transport Layer) is often known as the
"end-to-end" layer, since its responsibilities to some degree are
to recover from problems with an unreliable network. It is
generally assumed that layer four provides the end-to-end
integrity of the data, making sure that all detected errors have
been corrected, lost and duplicated packets have been taken care
of, and that the message (which was broken up into packets for
transmission over the network) has been put back together in the
correct sequence. From the host's point of view, the transport
layer is the communications provider.
Layers five through seven (the Session, Presentation, and
Application Layers) provide dialogue management, data
representation, and various other application services that would
be of common interest for various processes running in the host.
At the time that the reference model was being developed, these
layers were not well defined, but the committee felt that under
their set of rules for defining layers, there were good enough
arguments to separate session and presentation type protocols
from others that would reside in the Application layer.
The impact of this model cannot be ignored. All present protocol
standards have been influenced by this work, since the idea was
that specific protocols would be developed at each layer and that
the interfaces would be standardized allowing "stacks" of
protocols to be implemented for specific applications. This
influence will be seen in the SAFENETI Draft Standard. Security
issues at the time were not an important consideration of the
committee, and it is interesting to note that because of the
layering model, it has become an interesting problem deciding
were exactly in the model security protocols can be placed. A
second issue is the real concern that the layering makes a very
real problem for real-time communications, since each layer
produces some delay as the "protocol data units" are queued and
processed in each layer. The SAFENET I Draft has an interesting
way of dealing with this problem.
B. Local Network Standards
Work on the OSI reference model and its protocols continued to
develop, and the IEEE sponsored committee began to work on local
networking standards for the lower levels of the model. This led
to the IEEE 802 set of standards that is continuing to be
developed [IEEEa-d]. The significance of this work was that it
allowed the semiconductor industry to implement chip sets to
implement these protocols and interfaces, and therefore the
overall implementation cost of an OSI stack should be reduced and
the performance (in terms of speed) could be enhanced over
software implementations.
Two other groups were working in parallel to the IEEE 802
committee that have made a contribution to the standards related
to SAFENET I. In 1982 the manufacturing industry began to work
on a complete protocol stack for local area networking, which was
eventually handed over to the Society of Manufacturing Engineers.
This became the Manufacturing Automation Protocol whose stack (or
profile) is shown in Table 2 [BLACK89].
The second group, from the American National Standards
Institute, began working on high speed local network standards
with data rates from 50-100 Mbps. These rates are much higher
than the i-i0 Mbps data rates in the IEEE 802 standards. The
most recent work by this ANSI committee [X3T9.5] is the Fiber
Distributed Data Interface or FDDI standard, which uses a fiber
optics medium and has a data rate of I00 Mbps.
C. Implementation of Layer 3 and 4 Protocols in Hardware
There is also an effort underway to implement transfer services
(combination of layers 3 and 4) that will be very efficient
[XTP88]. This implementation is called the Xpress Transfer
Protocol (XTP) and is presently under development. It is
expected that a silicon implementation will eventually be
available, providing benefits similar to those of the IEEE 802
standards.
D. GOSIP
In summary, since its conception, the OSI model has become widely
discussed as a means of implementing "open" networks. As of
August 15 of this year, the United States Government will be
requiring new systems to follow OSI interoperability as specified
by the Government OSI Profile [DERN90], unless exempted. This
will have an impact on all agencies of the Federal Government
including the Navy and of course NASA.
III. THE SURVIVABLE, ADAPTABLE FIBER OPTIC EMBEDDABLE NETWORK
DOCUMENTS
A. The SAFENET I Executive Summary
The background behind SAFENET I is discussed in the SAFENET I
Executive Summary. It describes how the Next Generation Computer
Resource (NGCR) program was established in 1988 to provide
standardization for mission critical computer resources (MCCR).
Navy and industry representatives have been working together to
develop an open systems architecture to provide a basis for
multiple vendor support of Navy Local Area Networking (LAN)
requirements. (This is not unlike the goals of NASA and the
aerospace industries.)
The summary gives the basic overview of the standard's progress,
discussing the basic OSI profile, the standardization milestones,
and some implementation notes. SAFENET I should be finished in
September 1991 and SAFENET II by September 1992. SAFENET refers
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to the general profile, while the basic difference between
SAFENET I and II is that SAFENET I is based on IEEE 802.5 and
SAFENET II will require FDDI in the lower layers.
B. SAFENET I Military Standard
The formal draft military standard for SAFENET I is the second
attached document. It describes the scope, related documents,
definitions, general and detailed requirements. It is brief and
often uses the phrase that a particular item is "completely
described in MIL-HDBK-0034", the companion handbook for the
standard. Also direct references are made to other mil-
standards related to electronic requirements, specification
practices, and engineering concerns.
C. SAFENET I Military Handbook
This document provides over 133 pages of details on SAFENET I.
It includes the scope, related documents, and definitions. It
then continues with an overview of SAFENET I, its architecture,
and the requirements for the application interface, the
communication protocols, the physical medium, network management,
and time synchronization. It concludes with a number of
appendices including the selection of the SAFENET protocol
suites, user services, the NATO Network Independent Interface,
the transfer services, IEEE802.5 dual ring reconfiguration,
optical power budget, and last but not least, the SAFENET
security policy. The next sections cover a brief overview of
what I consider the interesting aspects of the handbook.
IV. THE ARCHITECTURE AND "SURVIVABILITY"
A. The Physical Topology
It is important to note that the "S" in SAFENET is
"survivability" and not "safety." To provide this characteristic
in the local network a dual ring topology is required. Figures
1 and 5 from the handbook illustrate the physical topology used
(See Appendix A.) There are two basic aspects that are important
to note. First of all there is a duplicate ring (and others are
possible). The token-ring LANmust implement the IEEE 802.5
recommended practice for dual ring reconfiguration, which is
currently being reviewed for inclusion into the IEEE standard.
Discussion of the reconfiguration process is included in Appendix
E of the handbook.
The second structure that improves the survivability of the
network is that each station is required to be attached to the
ring by way of a trunk coupling unit (TCU). The TCU is used to
isolate a station from the ring in the case of a failure. Up to
five stations on the ring can be bypassed in this fashion.
These two structures allow key network components to be located
apart from each other. The two rings can physically be located
in different places and the TCUs allow stations to be located
away from the points of attachment to either ring. (The point
being, of course, that a topology could be developed that would
allow some damage to the network without the network being
rendered inoperable.)
B. The Communication Architecture
The basic communication Architecture follows the OSI reference
model and hence follows the concept of having an OSI profile.
However it differs from the standard concept of the seven layers
in several ways. First of all, alternate suites are allowed.
Secondly, SAFENET breaks the layers down into three groupings of
services, to allow for physical interfacing (although this is not
very clear in the handbook). Finally, several paths exist, even
if only one profile is used. These issues will be discussed one
at a time.
There are two alternate protocol suites in the SAFENET I profile.
There is one called the SAFENET I OSI Profile and a second termed
the lightweight protocol suite (see Figure 2 in Appendix A).
Stations which only need to communicate with the OSI Profile will
be allowed to implement this portion of the SAFENET I Profile
alone. Real-time applications, however, are not generally suited
for the mechanisms developed for the protocols standardized by
the ISO. Hence a lightweight protocol suite which is
connectionless oriented (datagram type service) and a streamlined
set of user services (layers 5-7) is required. Either or both of
the alternate protocol suites can be implemented in a SAFENET
network. This of course means that not all stations will be able
to communicate with one another, unless the combined protocol
suite is used.
The architecture can also be viewed as being divided up into
three groupings of layers (see Figure 3 in Appendix A). The
user services (layers 5-7), the transfer services (layers 3 and
4 and part of layer 2), and the LAN services (layer i and part of
layer 2). Between the user services and the transfer services is
the transfer service interface, which could be conceptual only.
However, it allows for implementation alternatives that may
require a set of well-defined communication formats and
primitives. A hint of such an implementation is given in the
handbook appendix entitled "Overview of the NATO Network
Independent Interface" which occurs between the session and
transport layers. The division between transfer services and LAN
services shows the point where the SAFENET I and SAFENET II
differ. The assumption is that the LAN services for SAFENET I
will be IEEE 802.5 Token Ring and SAFENET II will be ANSI X3T9.5
FDDI.
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A block diagram showing the combined protocol suite and its four
possible pathways is found in Figure 4 of the handbook (see
appendix A). The first pathway is through the File, Transfer,
Access, and Management (FTAM) Protocol and then through the
Association Control Element (ASCE) and the remainder of the OSI
protocol suite, ending with a connection oriented transport layer
protocol that feeds into a connectionless network layer protocol.
This provides the communication services for applications that
require large file transfers, without real-time concerns. The
second path passes through a private communication application
interface (hence bypassing FTAM) but uses the remainder of the
services provided by the OSI protocol suite.
The third and fourth pathways pass through the lightweight
interface and support services before it splits. The assumption
here is that real-time applications (connectionless or datagram
packet switching) would use this protocol suite. In one option
the OSI connectionless (CL) transport protocol would pass data
units on to the OSI connectionless network protocol. In the
second the Xpress Transfer Protocol (XTP) would be used for layer
3 and 4 services. With the possible silicon implementation of
XTP it is likely that this fourth pathway will provide the best
option for real-time applications.
C. Management and Synchronization Protocols
The handbook also goes into detail concerning the network
management issues and the synchronization techniques. Basically
the management functions supported are:
i. Fault management
ii. Configuration and name management
iii. Performance management
iv. Security management
The management mechanisms supporting i.-iii, above are defined by
MAP 3.0 (which are also ISO standards), with a discussion of the
SAFENET Security Policy placed in a separate handbook appendix.
Synchronization services for the management functions are
provided by the SAFENET Global Time service. The Global Time
service synchronizes individual Global Clocks using a time
synchronization protocol. Details of the time synchronization
requirements are found in section I0 of the handbook.
D. It is important to the "Survivability" of the network
(and the safety and integrity of the system) that the
communication protocols are robust and well tested. It is also
important to note that the key to the physical topology's ability
to provide alternative physical paths is that the management of
the network functions properly to detect faults and reconfigure
the network. Implementations of the OSI protocol suite will
provide these functions. Thus the OSI protocol suite and the
combined suites will have management functions. However, if the
lightweight protocol suite is implemented alone then these
functions will be absent or will have to be provided by the
lightweight support services. Since these would have to be
developed, it is important that good software engineering
practices are used to develop and verify that the protocols
function properly.
V. SECURITY ISSUES
A. Security in Networks and the OSI model
In the 1970's and early 1980's there were a lot of developments
related to computers and security. During this time frame
computer security models were developed as well as standards for
security algorithms such as the Data Encryption Standard (NBS
77). Unfortunately developments with computer networks, although
occasionally related, generally developed separately from
security requirements. Hence in the 1980's work was done to
reconcile the issues of computer network security with the work
done by the ISO. Voydock and Kent [VOYK85] and Tardo [TARD85]
provide some of the background on the discussions as to where to
place security functions in the various layers and what
mechanisms could be used. OSI committees are still working on
draft standards and IEEE 802 committee members are working on how
to place security functions in local networks.
B. The SAFENET Security Policy
Appendix H of the SAFENET Military Handbook discusses the
Security Policy of SAFENET. It references several related
government documents, including the Department of Defense
Standard--Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (DOD 85),
the Trusted Network Interpretation of the Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria [NCS-88], and the Security Requirements for
Automated Information Systems (DOD-88). The appendix discusses
how security issues are not required for every procurement, and
that requirements are evolving and will continue to evolve.
The SAFENET security policy is defined in terms of security
domains. The concept of domains limits the scope of a particular
security policy. For SAFENET, the two domains are a Network
Security Domain and a End-System Security Domain. The Network
Security Domain Policy is for layers 1-7 (the LAN and transfer
services) while End-System Security Domain concerns the user
services of layers 5-7 and the mission-specific application-level
policy.
Basically systems using SAFENET will be required to meet
TCSEC/TNI Class 2 computer security requirements or higher,
depending on the risk factors. If encryption is required then
NSA's Secure Data Network System (SDNS) specification is to be
followed. This would place key distribution in layer 7, and the
encryption protocol in layer 3,4 or 7.
Appendix H also discusses security requirements and guidelines
for implementation. The specific requirements include host
accreditation, host identification, and user identification and
authentication. Also required are formal certification of
network components, formal and informal validation of network
programs, and a network activity audit trail for security
reviews. The document concludes with discussions of the
following requirements: network security office support, network
security level control, transmission medium security, and
assurance of communications availability.
C. Some Recent Developments in Security for Local Area
Networks.
The IEEE 802.10 subcommittee is presently working on the problem
of security services in layers 1 and 2. Some of the proposals
and discussions were presented at a workshop in 1989 [BERS89].
Because of the restriction to IEEE 802 related standards,
security issues for the higher layers were not discussed.
However, it was very interesting to read that in discussing
security, the old concepts of how LANS are defined are giving
way. One of the articles discusses how interoperability of LANS
and high speed data communications over long distances is doing
away with the concept of a LANbeing geographically limited.
Other articles discussed where encryption should take place and
concepts of LAN security servers. The implication to SAFENET is
that eventually OSI standards will affect the services available
to the transfer and user services, while IEEE 802.10 will provide
available security functions for the LAN services. Thus as the
SAFENET security policy evolves, these standards will surely play
an important role
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR AEROSPACE APPLICATIONS
Some of the basic implications for aerospace applications
as follows:
i. As SAFENET begins to appear in Navy procurement,
.
•
are
industry will be required to provide SAFENET systems.
It is assumed that the cost for similar systems for
non-Navy applications will be less expensive to
provide.
The number of Navy applications is likely to be very
large and problems will likely be found and corrected
more quickly.
Interoperability with the Navy and other US government
systems may require SAFENET specifications for NASA
systems.
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Of course all this may not be that positive. There is of course
the possibility that economics might push aerospace systems
toward a SAFENET type of implementation, even if it does not meet
all aerospace requirements. Hence it might be important to
follow SAFENET as it evolves and understand how it is related to
developing aerospace standards for communications.
Table I Communication Standards
(Taken from [STAL87])
ISO Standards
ISO 7498
DIS 8348
DIS 8473
ISO 8072
DIS 8073
DIS 8602
Basic Reference Model for Open Systems
Interconnection, 1984.
Network Service Definition
Protocol for Providing the
Connectionless-Mode Network Service
Transport Service Definition
Connection-Oriented Transport Protocol
Specification
Protocol for Providing the
Connectionless-Mode Transport Service
CCITT Standards
X.25 Interface Between Data Terminal Equipment
(DTE) and Data Circuit-Terminating
Equipment (DCE) for Terminals Operating in
the Packet Mode and Connected to Public
Data Networks by Dedicated Circuit
IEEE Standards
IEEE 802.2
IEEE 802.3
IEEE 802.4
IEEE 802.5
Logical Link Control
CSMA/CD Access Method
Token Bus Access Method
Token Ring Access Method
ANSI Standards
ANSI X3T9.5 Fiber Distributed Data Interface
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Table 2 MAP Stack
(Taken from [BLAC89])
Layer 7
Layer 6
Layer 5
Layer 4
Layer 3
Layer 2
Layer 1
ISO CASE Kernel, Four ASEs: FTAM, Directory
Service, Network Management, MMS
ISO 8822,8823,8824,8825
ISO 8326,8327,8326/DAD2,8327/DAD2
ISO 8072 and 8073 Class 4
ISO Connectionless Internet 8473 and others
IEEE 802.2, various types and classes
IEEE 802.4 Broadband (i0 Mbit/s) and
Carrierband (5 Mbit/s)
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SPECIAL NOTE: A copy of the SAFENET Documents is on file at
UHCL. These are:
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. REVIEW OF
SURVIVABLE ADAPTABLE FIBER OPTIC EMBEDDED NETWORK (SAFENET)
LOCAL AREA NETWORK (LAN) STANDARD AND HANDBOOK. 5230 Ser
324/051 19 Jun 90. This document contains the following
enclosures:
(i) Draft SAFENET I Military Standard (MCCR-0032-DRAFT)
(2) Draft SAFENET I Military Handbook (MCCR-0034-DRAFT)
(3) SAFENET I Executive Summary
(4) SAFENET I STANDARDIZATION IMPROVEMENT PROPOSAL
Appendix A. Figures from the SAFENET I Military Handbook
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